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1. Introduction and Motivation 
Many environmental programs require the agency in charge to set emissions or 
ambient quality standards. In the case of programs addressing contaminated sites, key 
decisions involve (i) to what extent pollution must be removed from soil, the subsurface 
and groundwater in order to protect human health, and (ii) whether contaminants should 
be removed, as opposed to implementing remedies that simply prevent human exposure 
to contaminants and/or off-site migration of the polluting substances in the short term. 
These are serious challenges in the U.S. Superfund program and in similar programs in 
other countries.  
Clearly, it would useful to compare the (monetized) value of more permanent 
reductions in the risks to human health with the costs of treating contaminated soil, 
groundwater and surface water. Doing so requires finding out how much the beneficiaries 
of these risk reductions are willing to pay to obtain them.  
Because contaminated sites often entail exposure to carcinogens and other 
toxicants with long-term effects on health, the reductions in risks to human health 
delivered by remediation must be paid for now but are accrued in the future. It is thus of 
interest to find out if the willingness to pay for risk reductions is affected by such a delay 
(“lag”), and, if so by how much. In this paper, we focus on the risks of dying associated 
with exposure to contaminants at hazardous waste sites and use conjoint choice questions   3
(Hanley et al., 2001) to answer this question and to explore people’s preferences for 
permanent remediation, and hence permanent risk reductions. We then illustrate the use 
of this approach with a sample selected to be representative of the residents of four cities 
in Italy with significant contaminated site problems. 
  We ask three related questions. First, how much are people willing to pay for each 
unit of mortality risk reduction? In other words, what is the public’s Value of a Statistical 
Life (VSL) that should be used for computing the benefits of contaminated site policies 
that save lives? Second, do people favor permanent cleanup policies, and are they willing 
to pay more for longer-lasting risk reductions? Third, what is the effect on willingness to 
pay of delaying the beginning of the mortality risk reductions?  
Although the concept of VSL is reasonably well accepted in academic and policy 
circles, and the VSL has been estimated using a variety of approaches,
1  there is 
surprisingly little empirical evidence about what VSL should be used in the context of 
contaminated site remediation. Gayer et al. apply the hedonic pricing approach to homes 
sold in the vicinity of Superfund sites in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and estimate the value 
of a statistical case of cancer is $3.9-4.6 million (1996 dollars) (Gayer et al., 2000) or 
$4.3-8.3 million (Gayer et al., 2002).  These values rely on specific assumptions about 
people’s subjectively assessed risks and about how they change in response to the release 
of information by the agency.  
Recent research (e.g., Chilton et al., 2002; Tsuge et al., 2005; 
Vassanadumrongdee and Matsuoka, 2005) has examined the effects of risk perceptions—
such as dread, degree of voluntariness, etc. (Fischoff et al., 1978; McDaniels et al., 
                                                 
1 See Ashenfelter (2006) for a recent discussion of the VSL and Viscusi (2003) for an overview of VSL 
figures estimated in compensating wage studies.   
   4
1992)—on the value of reducing these risks, but results are mixed, so it is unclear if, and 
by how much, existing VSL estimates from other contexts should be adjusted to cater to 
hazardous waste site risks. 
For these reasons, we use a stated-preference approach to elicit the tradeoffs that 
people make between income and risk reductions in the hazardous waste site context. 
Specifically, we showed people pairs of hypothetical public programs described by five 
attributes—the annual risk reduction afforded by the program, the size of the population 
living in the area with the contaminated sites that would be addressed by the program, 
how soon such risk reductions would be observed, the number of years over which the 
risk reduction would be observed (and hence lives would be saved), and the cost to the 
taxpayer. We then asked them to indicate (i) which they would prefer out of these two 
programs, and (ii) which they would prefer, program A, program B, or neither.  
Statistical modeling of the responses to (i) and (ii) allows us to estimate the 
VSL—the first of our research questions.  In addition, it allows us to answer two related 
questions: In the context of contaminated site policies, is the VSL affected by the 
individual characteristics of the respondent? Are the responses to the choice questions 
and the implied WTP figures internally valid, in the sense that they depend in predictable 
ways on variables suggested by economic theory and confirm opinions expressed by the 
respondent elsewhere in the questionnaire? 
  Because the time it takes before lives are saved and the number of years over 
which lives would be saved are varied to the respondents, the responses to the conjoint 
choice questions can be used to estimate the rate at which people discount future risk 
reductions. Were such a rate found to be low, we would conclude that people care for   5
permanent risk reductions, and that their WTP for risk reductions is little affected by the 
lag until the risk reductions are incurred. The opposite conclusions would be reached if 
the discount rate was found to be relatively high.  
Earlier research has estimated the rates at which people discount lives saved in the 
future (Cropper et al., 1991, 1992) and the rates at which people trade off current income 
for future reductions in their own risk of dying (Horowitz and Carson, 1990; Moore and 
Viscusi, 1990; Hammitt and Liu, 2004; Alberini et al., 2006), but to our knowledge none 
of these studies are specific to or easily adapted to contaminated site cleanup policies. 
None of them asked how much more people are prepared to pay for permanent risk 
reductions.
2  
In this study, we pay special attention to the internal validity of the responses, so 
we inquire about people’s preferences for permanence through direct attitude questions. 
We also compare the discount rate estimated from money v. risk tradeoffs with that at 
which people discount lives.   
Finally, we note that by including among the attributes of the hypothetical 
programs the size of the population living in the areas with the targeted contaminated 
sites, we explore the question whether people care more for small risk reductions spread 
over a large population or for larger risk reductions that affected a smaller population. 
Here, attention is restricted to the hazardous waste site context, but this question is also of 
great interest when comparing, say, air pollution policies, where the risk reductions are 
small and cover a very large population, with other environmental policies targeted at 
very specific populations.  
                                                 
2 Viscusi and Huber (2006) estimate the rate at which people discount the future benefits of clean water 
policies in the US.    6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe key 
concepts, including the VSL, and our methodology, including the conjoint choice 
questions and the model of the responses to these questions. Section 3 describes the 
survey questionnaire and the administration of the survey. Section 4 presents the data and 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Key Concepts, Methods and Models 
A. What is the The Value of a Statistical Life? 
  The VSL is the marginal value of a reduction in the risk of dying, and is therefore 







=  ,  
where WTP signifies the willingness to pay for a change in the risk of dying, and R is the 
risk of dying. The VSL can be equivalently described as the total WTP by a group of N 
people experiencing a uniform reduction of 1/N in their risk of dying. To illustrate, 
consider a group of 10,000 individuals, and assume that each of them is willing to pay 
€30 to reduce his or her own risk of dying by 1 in 10,000. The VSL implied by this WTP 
is €30/0.0001, or €300,000.  
  The concept of VSL is generally deemed as the appropriate construct for ex ante 
policy analyses, when the identities of the people whose lives are saved by the policy are 
not known yet. The mortality benefits of a policy that saves L lives are equal to (VSL×L). 
 
B. Policy Relevance   7
Because hazardous waste site programs purport to eliminate or reduce threats to 
public health and to reduce mortality risks, the VSL is a relevant concept when one wants 
to estimate the benefits of one such program and compare them with its costs. In the US, 
the Superfund statute spells out cleanup criteria to be adopted at the most egregious 
contaminated sites in the nation, which are placed on the so-called National Priorities List 
and may qualify for publicly financed cleanup.
3  
Specifically, EPA managers are directed to select target risk reductions to protect 
human health and meet any “legally applicable” or “relevant and appropriate” standards 
(e.g., maximum contaminant limits in groundwater), regardless of cost (Revesz and 
Stewart, 1995). When selecting among alternative remedies that attain the selected target 
risk reduction, consideration must be given to cost-effectiveness, practicable technologies 
and permanent remediation—as opposed to simple containment to prevent migration of 
pollutant and to limit exposure. Permanent remedies are generally more expensive, but 
Gupta et al. (1996) find that the EPA has indeed heeded this preference for permanent 
cleanups in its remediation decisions.
4   
                                                 
3 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly 
dubbed “Superfund”) was passed in 1980 to address the problem of hazardous waste sites and the risks they 
pose to human health and ecological systems. The Superfund program provides for both emergency, short-
term “removals” and remedial actions, which imply more or less permanent measures to reduce 
contamination. The statute also created an extensive and far-reaching liability system. The courts have 
interpreted the Superfund liability to be strict, retroactive, and joint-and-several. The liability system (and 
hence cleanup financing), cleanup processes and targets have been debated since the onset of the program. 
See, among others, Barnett (1994), Harper and Adams (1996), Hird (1994), Revesz and Stewart (1995), 
Viscusi and Hamilton (1999), Hamilton and Viscusi (1999), and Probst and Konisky (2001). 
4 Gupta et al. (1996) empirically examine the preferences for permanence implicit in EPA’s cleanup 
decisions at 110 wood preserving and PCB-contaminated Superfund sites. They focus on the choice of 
cleanup technology for contaminated soil, where the least permanent and expensive option is to simply cap 
the soil, and more permanent and more expensive options typically including excavating the soil and 
placing it in approved landfill or treating it. Gupta et al. find that the EPA does have a preference for more 
permanent cleanup options, but not at any cost, in the sense that the agency is less likely to choose a more 
permanent remedy as the cost of the remedy increases. Still, the agency values permanence, in that the 
premium it attaches to on-site incineration of waste (over and above the cost of capping it) is $12 million 
(1987 dollars) at relatively small sites, and up to $40 million at large sites.   8
Recent state programs, however, seem to be reversing this preference for 
permanence. State voluntary cleanup programs, for example, offer a variety of incentives 
in exchange for site cleanup (Meyer, 2000; US General Accounting Office [GAO], 
1997), including simplified or variable cleanup standards linked to land use, engineering 
controls (e.g., caps, fences, or other physical means of preventing contact with pollution), 
and/or institutional controls, such as permanent land use restrictions at the site or 
monitoring of the contamination plume, in place of (more stringent) cleanups. The US 
GAO (1997) surveyed 17 state VCP programs and found that over 50% of the cleanups 
entailed non-permanent remedies and/or adopted industrial land use standards.   
Several European countries face similar dilemmas. In Italy, for example, 
legislation addressing hazardous waste sites was first passed in 1997. The statute contains 
an explicit preference for permanent remediation and for on-site treatment of 
contaminated media, but recent analyses conducted by the Italian Environmental 
Protection Agency and environmental organizations (APAT, 2004; Legambiente, 2005) 
point out that the majority of actions at NPL and non-NPL contaminated sites have, thus 
far, been short-term and impermanent. For several reasons—because this outcome 
potentially conflicts with the European Union’s sustainability goals, because the Italian 
law places the burden of remediation at orphan sites on municipalities,
5 because funding 
for cleanup is limited,
6 and because of a recent law that emphasizes the role of risk 
                                                 
5 Unlike its US counterpart, the Italian Superfund statute is not retroactive. The law provides for “orphan” 
sites—sites where the party responsible for the contamination is insolvent or no longer in existence, placing 
the burden on these sites on the municipalities.  
6 The estimated cleanup costs for the sites on the Italian NPL are €3,149 million, but the available public 
funding tops off at €541 million.    9
assessment
7—it is important to study people’s preferences for more or less permanent 
risk reductions and to elicit the VSL in this context.  
 
C. Our Conjoint Choice Questions 
Conjoint choice questions (also termed “experiments”) are a survey-based 
technique frequently used to place a value on a good or estimate the benefits of a public 
program. The approach is based on stated preferences, in the sense that it asks individuals 
what they would do under hypothetical circumstances, rather than observing actual 
behaviors on marketplaces.  
In a conjoint choice survey, a good or public program is described in a stylized 
fashion by a vector of attributes. Respondents are shown K alternative variants of this 
good or program obtained by taking combinations of the possible values of the attributes, 
and are asked to choose the most preferred (Hanley et al., 2001). The alternatives differ 
from one another in the levels taken by two or more of the attributes. An advantage of 
this method is that it is flexible and that it can span goods/programs, levels of risk 
reductions and other aspects of environmental quality that do not currently exist. 
Respondent choices are assumed to be motivated by a random utility model and to 
trade off the attributes of the alternatives. If one of the attributes of the alternatives is its 
cost, it is possible to calculate the marginal price of each attribute. If a “do nothing” or 
status quo option is included in the choice set, the choice experiments can be used to 
estimate the full value of—i.e., the WTP for—each alternative.  
                                                 
7 The new law (Decree N. 152/06, which went into force on April 29, 2006) places a major emphasis on 
risk assessment, which is to be done when the level of contamination in soil or water exceeds the maximum 
limit set by the law.   10
In our conjoint choice questions, respondents are asked to consider hypothetical 
public programs that would clean up sites where the responsible parties are no longer in 
existence or do not have the means to pay for remediation. Respondents are also told that 
the government would be in charge of the remediation programs, and that the programs 
would be guaranteed to be effective.  
The specifics of the programs are described using five attributes, namely (i) the 
risk reduction per year, (ii) the size of the population living in the areas with the 
contaminated sites targeted by the program, (iii) the delay until the risk reduction begins, 
(iv) the number of years over which the risk reduction would be observed, and (v) the 
cost of the program to the respondent, which would be incurred as an immediate, and 
one-time, tax. Clearly, attribute (iii) gets at the heart of the latency issue,
8 and attribute 
(iv) captures the degree of permanence of the risk reductions.
9  
The respondents are shown a total of four pairs of hypothetical programs 
constructed in this fashion. They are first asked to indicate which of the two programs—
A or B—they prefer, and then indicate which they would choose out of program A, 
program B, or neither. This results in a total of 8 conjoint choice questions where the size 
of the choice set is 2 (when choosing between A and B) or 3 (when choosing between A, 
B, and the status quo).  
                                                 
8 By latency, we refer to a future risk reduction. In this paper, the terms “lag” and “latency” are used 
interchangeably. 
9 DeShazo and Cameron (2005), Tsuge et al. (2005), and Itaoka et al. (2006) are other recent applications of 
the conjoint choice approach to value mortality risk reductions. DeShazo and Cameron ask respondents to 
choose between profiles defined by expected lifetime, risk, illness and recovery, and cost to the respondent. 
Tsuge et al. ask people to choose between two stylized government programs described by cost, size of the 
risk reduction, type of risk (accident, cancer, heart disease, or a generic type of risk), and latency, finding 
that the VSL is not sensitive to the type of risk, but does vary with latency and individual characteristics of 
the respondent. Itaoka et al. compare low probability/large loss events with higher probability/small loss 
events in the context of electric power generation in Japan.   11
An example of the conjoint choice questions is reported in Appendix A, and a 
summary of attributes and levels is reported in table 1. In earlier focus groups and one-
on-one tests, people had generally deemed these attributes and attribute levels reasonable 
and acceptable. We emphasize that the risk reductions were presented to the respondents 
as the number of lives saved per million people (from the mortality rate due to 
contaminated site exposures in the absence of cleanup).  
 
Table 1. Attributes and attribute levels in the conjoint choice questions. 
Attribute   Levels of the attribute 
Lives saved per million people ( R ∆ )  10, 20, 30 
Population living in the areas with the 
contaminated sites covered by the program (N) 
0.5 million, 1 million, 2 million 
Delay (number of years until the risk reduction 
is incurred) (A) 
2, 10 
Duration of the health benefits (number of 
years) (T) 
20, 30, 45 
One-time tax payment for the respondent’s  
household (C) (in euro) 
50, 100, 300, 500, 950 
 
 
That risk reductions will be realized no earlier than two years from now (attribute 
(ii) or “Delay” in table 1) is consistent with the notion that the pollutants at most 
contaminated sites are carcinogens or cause long-term health effects, and with the fact 
that it takes some time to complete even the most efficient government remediation 
program. It is also reasonable to assume that no remediation program can reduce risks 
forever: hence, we set the duration of the risk reductions at 20, 30 or 45 years. These may 
be interpreted as time to failure of the remedies. The delay and duration attributes provide 
variation in the timing of the mortality risk reductions across and within respondents,   12
which we exploit for the purpose of estimating the rate at which people discount future 
risks.  
We chose a one-time tax to be incurred immediately for two reasons. First, since 
risk reductions are incurred in the future, this allows us to estimate the rate at which 
people discount risks. Second, in focus groups and during the survey development work 
people voiced strong opinions against taxes and against committing to pay annual taxes 
over a long period of time. We certainly did not want people to dismiss our scenarios 
outright, and a one-time tax was the most appealing option.  
We also vary the size of the population living in the areas with the contaminated 
sites that would be addressed by the program, and hence potentially affected by the risk 
reductions. We chose hypothetical populations of 0.5, 1 and 2 million because these 
levels were judged credible by focus groups participants, especially when compared with 
the total population living in areas with NPL sites (7 million; see section 3), and because 
we felt that respondents could easily form a sense of the size of these populations by 
comparing them with those of the cities they live in.  
We created a total of 32 sets with four pairs of programs each. We began this task 
by creating all of the possible alternative programs (i.e., all possible combinations of the 
levels of the attributes). We then formed all of the possible pairs, but excluded pairs that 
contained dominated alternatives.
10  The 32 sets we used for the survey were obtained by 
selecting four pairs at random (without replacement) out of this universe of non-
dominated pairs.  Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the 32 sets. 
 
                                                 
10 A pair has a dominated alternative if one of them is obviously better (e.g., saves more lives over a longer 
period of time) and no more expensive than the other.   13
D. The Model 
We assume that in the conjoint choice questions our respondents choose the 
alternative with the highest indirect utility, and that the indirect utility depends on the 
discounted stream of risk reductions and on residual income. Formally,  
(2)   ) ( ij i ij C y DR V − + ⋅ = β α ,  
where  ij V  denotes the deterministic component of the indirect utility function, DR is the 
discounted flow of risk reductions delivered by program j, y is income and C is the cost 
of the program to the respondent. Coefficients α and β denote the marginal utility of the 
discounted flow of risk reductions and the marginal utility of income, respectively.  We 
assume constant exponential discounting and define DR as 
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where  R ∆  is the annual risk reduction (which is varied to the respondents but constant 
over the years), δ is the discount rate, A is the number of years one must wait before the 
risk reductions are observed, and T is the number of years over which lives are saved. 
Expression (3) shows the effect of a delay in the beginning of the risk reduction (captured 
by the term 
A e
δ − ) and  the effect of more or less permanent risk reductions (captured by 
term in brackets).  
On appending an error term  ij ε , equation (2) becomes a random utility model, 
which in turn results in a conditional logit model if we further assume that the error terms 
ij ε  are independent across alternatives within the same respondent and follow the 
standard type I extreme value distribution. The probability that option k is selected out of 
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and the log likelihood function of our sample is  
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where yimk is a binary indicator that takes on a value of 1 if the respondent i selects 
alternative k in choice question m, and 0 otherwise, Km denotes the number of the 
alternatives the respondent is faced with in choice question m, and M denotes the total 
number of choice questions asked of the respondent.
11 Equation (5) thus describes a non-
linear conditional logit. It assumes that the choice responses are independent within and 
across respondents.  
  The maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients can be used to compute the 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for any given program: 






The VSL, i.e., the willingness to pay for a marginal risk reduction to be incurred in the 
current year, is equal to  ) ˆ / ˆ ( β α .  
 
                                                 
11 We remind the reader that individuals faced a total of four pairs of programs. For each pair of programs, 
the respondent was asked two choice questions: (i) which of the two programs—A or B—is judged more 
attractive, and (ii) which is the most preferred option—program A, program B, or neither (the status quo)? 
This results in a total of eight conjoint choice questions, hence M=8, Km=2 for m=1, 3, 5, and 7, and Km=3 
for m=2, 4, 6, and 8.   15
E. Hypotheses  
Clearly, model (2)-(3) assumes that the VSL is constant with respect to the size of 
the risk reduction and the size of the population that would benefit from the cleanup. In 
this paper, we wish to test if the VSL does indeed vary with the number of beneficiaries 
of the program. To do so, we amend equation (2) to obtain: 
(7)     ) ( 2 3 1 2 5 . 0 1 ij i ij C y DR DR DR V − + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = β α α α ,  
where  5 . 0 DR =DR if the size of the population affected by the program is 0.5 million and 
0 otherwise,  1 DR =DR if the size of the population affected by the program is 1 million 
and 0 otherwise, and  2 DR =DR if the size of the population affected by the program is 2 
million and 0 otherwise. We then test the null hypothesis that  3 2 1 α α α = = . Failure to 
reject the null implies that equation (7) is simplified to equation (2), i.e., the marginal 
utility of a risk reduction is not affected by the size of the population of beneficiaries of 
the program, N.  
Another interesting null hypothesis is that  1 2 2α α =  and  2 3 2α α = .  This null 
hypothesis implies that what enters in the utility function is the discounted number of 
lives saved, rather than discounted risk. The indirect utility function would thus be 
(8)   ) ( ij i ij C y L V − + ⋅ = β γ ,  
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Equations (8) and (9) mean that the VSL is strictly proportional to N, the size of the 
population living in the areas targeted by the hypothetical program.    16
We are also interested in testing whether the marginal utility of risk reductions 
and the marginal utility of income depend on individual characteristics. To see if this is 
the case, we amend equation (1) (or (6)) to allow for heterogeneity among the 
respondents.
12 Specifically, we posit that the marginal utility of risk reduction for 
respondent i is  2 1 α xi i + = α α  and that the marginal utility of income is  i i P 2 1 β β β + = , 
where xi is a vector of individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, own 
health, familiarity with contaminated sites and remediation, acceptance of government 
policies addressing hazardous waste sites, etc., and P is a low-income dummy. In other 
words, we form interaction terms between the arguments of equation (2)—DR and 
residual income—and xi and P, respectively, and add these interactions in the right-hand 
side of the indirect utility function:  
(10)   ] ) [( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 i ij i ij i i ij ij ij P C y C y DR DR V − + − ⋅ + × + ⋅ = β β α α x .  
Finally, it is possible to replace δ with a function of individual characteristics zi of 
the respondent, such as age, whether he or she is married and has young children, etc.:  
π δ i i z = .  
 
3. Structure of the Questionnaire and Survey Administration 
Our conjoint choice questions are at the heart of our questionnaire and are 
accordingly placed roughly in the middle of the survey instrument. They are preceded by 
many other questions that first find out what people already know about specific 
problems or concepts (e.g., contaminated sites, health risks from exposure to 
                                                 
12 As shown below, although we find that the marginal utility of risk reduction is different for different 
population sizes, in practice the VSL is constant with respect to population size. For this reason, we 
incorporate covariates only in the simpler specification of the indirect utility function, allowing α and β to 
vary across respondents but not across the size of population in the conjoint choice questions.    17
contaminants, remediation) or feel about policy options, and then educate them about 
risks, remediation techniques, etc.  
The questionnaire is comprised of 5 sections. Section 1 begins with asking people 
whether and how they are acquainted with contaminated sites. Since a respondent’s 
notion of contaminated site may be different from our own, we then provide the 
following definition: “A contaminated site is a parcel or an area with hazardous 
substances that pose risks to human health or the environment, now or in the future. 
These hazardous substances are the result of human activities. Electromagnetic 
fields/pollution and air pollution are not considered contaminated sites in this 
questionnaire.” In section 2, we briefly describe the problem of contaminated sites in 
Italy and provide succint information about the total population living in areas with sites 
on the National Priorities List—the most egregious contaminated sites—and thus 
potentially exposed to contaminants, current legislation and government policies. 
In section 3 we inquire about the health risks people perceive to be associated 
with contaminated sites, and then explain, using animation, how people are typically 
exposed to contaminants. A list of the possible short- and long-term health effects of 
exposure to certain substances follows. For example, respondents are told that heavy 
metals have been linked with kidney damage, adverse effects on the neurological and 
immune systems, and may cause cancer. 
At this point, we focus on mortality endpoints and provide an estimate of the 
baseline mortality risks associated with exposure to pollutants found at contaminated 
sites. Specifically, respondents are told that exposures to pollutants at contaminated sites 
results in 243 deaths per million people a year and that a total of about 7 million people   18
live in the areas with National Priorities List sites, resulting in an estimated 1700 deaths 
per year linked to contaminated site exposures.
13 
When asking people to value risk reductions for a specific cause, it is important 
that respondents be told how this risk compares with mortality rates for other causes. This 
is exactly what we do in the next screen, which displays a bar chart with the most 
important causes of death in Italy (i.e., cardiovascular causes, which account for 4480 
deaths per million people every year; cancer, which accounts for 2290 deaths per million 
people every year), and, for comparison, less frequent but familiar causes of death, such 
as road-traffic accident (125 in a million per year) or carbon monoxide poisoning (35 in 




                                                 
13 We were not able to find estimates of the risks and population at risk for the sites on the Italian National 
Priorities List. We calculated an estimate of the baseline risks before cleanup by transferring estimates of 
risks in other contaminated areas in Italy. Specifically, we relied on a World Health Organization study 
which identifies highly industrialized and polluted areas in Italy, computes mortality rates for men and 
women in these areas in 1990-94, and compares them with those of the surrounding regions. This study 
concludes that in those years the highly industrialized areas experienced about 800 excess deaths per year 
(Martuzzi et al., 2002; Mitis et al., 2005). When this figure is divided by the exposed population (3,295,380 
people), we obtain an excess risk of about 243 per million, which we posit to be our baseline risk.    19




















 Number of deaths in 1,000,000 Italian people in a year 
Caused by the following diseases*:
Cardio-vascular diseases 63
Cancer 40
Respiratory system diseases 54
Digestive tract diseases 36
Cirrhosis 27
Other 23
* These deaths are not included in the other

















Since our conjoint choice questions are concerned with public programs, we next 
inquire about how important it is for the respondent to reduce the health risks posed by 
contaminated sites, and how much confidence they place in public policies such as 
economic incentives for firms, dissemination of information, more stringent inspections, 
institutional controls, and remediation undertaken directly by the government at orphan 
sites.  
In section 4 we present the concept of remediation and provide examples of 
possible remediation technologies, pointing out that they vary in terms of cost and 
completion time, and that different sites and pollutants require different remedies. For 
example, pump-and-treat options are appropriate for contaminated groundwater, while 
bioremediation may be used at petroleum sites.   
This is followed by the conjoint choice experiment portion of the questionnaire.  
A reminder of the baseline risks is shown at the top of each screen with the pairs of 
programs and the associated choice questions. 
We use additional questions to gather further evidence about preferences for 
saving lives and about the rate of time preference. For example, we ask our respondents 
which option they would prefer, a program that saves 100 lives now, or one that saves 
(100+X) in Y years, where the respondents are told to assume equal costs, and both X 
and Y are varied to the respondents. The discount rate for lives saved implicit in the 
responses to these questions can be compared to the one implicit in the money v. future 
risk reductions tradeoffs in the conjoint choice questions.    21
We also ask people to express their agreement or disagrement with statements 
spelling out possible priorities for cleanup and risk reductions. Section 5 concludes the 
questionnaire with the usual sociodemographic questions and with questions about the 
respondent’s own health.  
The survey was self-administered using the computer by respondents recruited 
from the general population in four cities in Italy (Venice, Milan, Bari and Naples
14) in 
May 2005, for a total of 804 completed questionnaires. The sample was stratified by age, 
with an equal number of respondents in each of three broad age groups (25-44, 45-54, 55-
65), and was comprised of a roughly equal number of men and women. We did not 
expect all respondents to be familiar with computers, so we made sure that two 
interviewers were present at the survey facilities at all times to welcome the respondents, 
introduce the survey to them and provide assistance if requested. 
 
4. Results 
A. The Sample 
Descriptive statistics of the respondents are displayed in table 2. Our sample is 
well-balanced in terms of gender, and its distribution by age is consistent with the 
sampling plan. The average age is 47. The average annual household income is 
approximately €27,000, which is close to, but slightly lower than, the national average 
(€29,483, Banca d’Italia, 2006). 
                                                 
14 These cities were selected to ensure geographic representativeness and because each has one or more 
sites on the National Priorities List. The chemical and oil refining complex of Porto Marghera in the Venice 
hinterland is probably the most egregious contaminated site on the NPL, with soils, groundwater and 
Lagoon sediments contaminated by polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), heavy metals and many 
other pollutants. The former Fibronit complex, an asbestos-processing facility, is located in downtown Bari, 
while the NPL site in Naples is a closed steel mill. Milan, as the center of a large industrial area, has several 
NPL sites.    22
Almost 50% of our sample has a high school diploma and 13.43% has a college 
degree or higher education. Comparison with population statistics reveals that our sample 
has a larger share of persons with high school diploma than the population, but is similar 
to the population in terms of share of persons with college degree or post-graduate 
education. (The population statistics are 32% and 11%, respectively.) Table 1B in 
Appendix B displays other descriptive statistics for education in the sample and in the 
populations of the four cities. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the respondents (N=804) 
Variable Description  Mean  Stand.  Devn.  Min  Max 
Male 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the 
respondent is a male  
0.51 0.50  0  1 
Age   Respondent age   47.02  11.25  25  65 
Married  
 
Dummy equal to 1 if 
married 
0.73 0.44  0  1 
age2534  Respondent is aged 25-34  0.19  0.39  0  1 
age3544  Respondent is aged 35-34  0.18  0.38  0  1 
age4554  Respondent is aged 45-54  0.29  0.46  0  1 
age55plus 
Respondent is aged 55 or 
older  0.34 0.47  0  1 
Collegedegree  
 
Dummy equal to 1 if 
respondent  has a college 
degree or post-graduate 
education   0.13 0.34  0  1 
Household size  Number of household 
members 
3.26 1.17  1  8 
Children5 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if 
respondent has children of 






26,955 16,872  5,000  100,000 
 
Regarding their familiarity with contaminated sites, as shown in table 3, 90% of 
the respondents stated that they had heard about contaminated sites before. Most of these 
persons reported that they learned about contaminated sites by watching television.     23
Forty-three percent of the sample indicated that they are aware of contaminated sites near 
their homes or workplaces. Fully 80% of the respondents were acquainted with the 
concept of cleanup, and 37% stated that they were personally aware of previously 
contaminated sites that had been subsequently cleaned up.  
 
Table 3: Knowledge of contaminated sites. N=804. 
Variable  Description  Percent of 
the sample 
HEARD  Respondent has heard about contaminated sites 
before 
90.04 
KNOWSITE  Respondent is aware of a contaminated site near 
home or the workplace 
43.16 
HEARBONI Respondent has heard about cleanup of 
contaminated sites before 
79.98 
KNOWBONI  Respondent is aware of a contaminated site that 
has been cleaned up 
36.70 
 
In table 4 we report the respondents’ views of possible priorities for contaminated 
site policies, answers to debriefing questions, and concern about mortality risks, which 
we use to examine the internal validity of the responses to the conjoint choice questions. 
As show in table 4, almost 89% of the respondent stated that it is “very important” to 
them personally to reduce the human health risks posed by contaminated sites. Only 7% 
of the respondents indicated that they only thought of future generations when answering 
the conjoint choice questions. Indeed, the majority (76%) of the respondents thought 
about their own exposure, that of their family members, of other people and of future 
generations, with only 2.86% focusing exclusively on themselves and 2.99% focusing 
exclusively on other people’s exposure.    24
Fully 40% of the sample strongly agreed that cleanups should take place, even if 
their benefits are experienced only 30 years from now, and 80% expressed strong 
agreement with the statement that cleanups should be as permanent as possible, even if 
they cost more.
15 At the same time, 69% of the sample deemed policies based on fencing 
off and prohibiting access to contaminated sites “very helpful.” Taken together with table 
3, these statistics suggest that most people have at least some rudimentary information 
about contaminated sites and cleanup programs, that the latter should be meaningful to 
them, and that they should accept our hypothetical scenarios, which depict public 
remediation programs.
16 
Finally, about 30% of the sample reported that a family member has had or has 
cancer, and 45% claimed that they do use seatbelt when riding in the backseat of a car. 
We interpret familiarity with cancer as a proxy for concern over this illness, and use of 
seatbelt as concern for, and willingness to undertake action against, mortality risks (albeit 
of a different nature than cancers and other illnesses associated with exposures to 
contaminants). 
                                                 
15 To further elaborate on this matter, when asked to express agreement or disagrement with the statement 
that “Priority should be given to permanent and effective cleanups even if they are more expensive,” 
79.60% of the respondents “strongly” agreed, 12.31% was in agreement with the statement, 5.85% was 
neutral, and only 1.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed (see Turvani et al., 2006). 
16 These conclusions are further corroborated by the responses to other Likert-scale questions, which 
suggest that respondents expect the government to take an active role in the management of contaminated 
site situations. Specifically, two-thirds of the sample state that it would be “very useful” to offer tax credits 
and other economic incentives to firms to encourage cleanups, and over 80% ascribe the same degree of 
usefulness to direct government cleanup of orphan sites. Almost 90% find stringent inspections and 
regulatory approaches to pollution control “very useful” (see Turvani et al., 2006). 
   25
Table 4. Opinions on contaminated sites policies and 
concern about mortality risks. N=804. 
Variable  Description  Percent of 
the  sample 
Impexpos  Respondent  deems it very important to reduce the adverse 




Respondent thought only of future generations when 
answered conjoint choice questions 
7.21 
 
Futben  Favorable to cleanup even if its benefits are experienced 30 
or more years from now 
40.55 
Durat  Respondent strongly agrees that remediation should be as 
permanent as possible even it costs more 
79.60 
Cartelli  Respondents deems policies based on fencing off 
contaminated sites and preventing access very helpful  
68.53 
Famcancer  Respondent’s family members have had cancer   29.98 




B. Responses to the Choice Questions 
Following Viscusi et al. (1991), we checked how many people always pick plan A 
in all of the eight choice questions (87 people, or 10.82% of the sample), plan B in all 
eight choice questions (60 people, for 7.46% of the sample), and exhibited preference 
“reversals”
17 in one or more choice questions (65 people, or 8.31% of the sample). 
Always choosing the plan on the left or the plan on the right (or exhibiting a “reversal”) 
does not necessarily imply that people are violating the basic tenets of the random utility 
model, but at any rate these behaviors account for very small fractions of the sample. 
In table 5 we examine the choice frequencies observed when people were given 
the option to choose between program A, program B, and the status quo. The frequency 
of “neither program” responses is less than 20%, suggesting that people were not 
                                                 
17 A preference reversal would be observed if, for example, when asked to choose between A and B, the 
respondent states that B is the more preferred program, and then, when asked which he prefers among A, B, 
and the status quo, he chooses A.   26
dismissing the public programs being shown to them without giving them due 
consideration. The remainder are rather even split between program A and B, suggesting 
that there were no obvious choices between the hypothetical programs.  
 
Table 5. Frequencies of observed responses to the question “Which would you prefer  
between A, B, and neither program?” 







1  42.41 37.69 19.9 
2  43.66 37.81 18.53 
3  42.16 40.67 17.16 
4  42.79 39.05 18.16 
 
C. VSL Estimates 
  The results of the non-linear conditional logit models of the responses to the 
conjoint choice questions are reported in table 6.  The indirect utility function underlying 
the two logits is equation (7), and the two regressions differ solely for the criteria we used 
to clean the sample. Model I uses the full sample, which consists of 782 usable 
observations.
18  For good measure, in model II we further discard those subjects who 
failed all of the four probability comprehension quizzes (N=58) and/or exhibited 
preference reversals (N=65). The estimation results are very similar to those of model I.
  Briefly, table 6 shows clearly that risk reductions are positively and significantly 
valued by the respondents. Within a model, the estimated αj coefficients (where j denote 
                                                 
18 A total of 804 respondents completed the questionnaire, but we discarded the choice responses of the 22 
individuals who were shown a conjoint choice question screen with a typographical error in the risk 
reduction.   27
the population size, ranging from half a million to 2 million) are within 10 to 20% of one 
another. The marginal utility of income is positive and significant, and the discount rate is 
pegged at 6.9%.  
Wald test statistics of 66.69 (for the full sample; p-value < 0.0001) and 51.09 (for 
the “cleaned” sample; p-value < 0.0001) reject soundly the null hypothesis that  1 2 2α α =  
and  2 3 2α α = , providing evidence against indirect utility (9).
19  Wald test statistics of 
10.02 and 12.45 for the full and “cleaned” samples, respectively, also reject the null that 










Cleaned data (no 
preference reversals, 
no allwrong=1) 
  coefficient t stat.  Coefficient  t stat. 
ALPHA1 0.0049 8.19 0.0045  7.104
ALPHA2 0.0053 8.187 0.0051  7.228
ALPHA3 0.0044 7.85 0.0041  6.838
BETA 0.0009 11.595 0.0009  11.29




N obs  6256  5296 
N respondents  782  662 
 
                                                 
19 We also estimated a conditional logit equation (shown in Appendix C) that assumes that the deterministic 
component of the indirect utility is a linear combination of the attributes of the alternatives. This model 
must be estimated separately for the subsample with Delay=2 and the subsample with Delay=10. The logit 
coefficients indicate that the likelihood of selecting a program increases with the size of the risk reduction 
and decreases with its cost, and does not depend on the size of the population living in the areas with the 
contaminated sites to be targeted by the hypothetical programs for Delay=2, whereas it is negatively related 
to it for Delay=10. The effect of duration is consistent with our expectations for Delay=2 but is 
insignificant for Delay=10. 
20 The respective P-values are 0.001 and 0.00047, respectively.   28
The VSL for a risk reduction to be incurred in the current year implied by the 
coefficients of model I in table 6 is €5.547 million (standard error around the VSL €0.806 
million) when the affected population is 0.5 million, €5.996 million (s.e. €0.929 million) 
when the population is 1 million, and €5.056 million (s.e. €0.840 million) when the 
affected population is 2 million.
21, 
22  
Even more importantly, these three VSL figures are not statistically different from 
one another, so in what follows we estimate (non-linear) conditional logit models that 
restrict the marginal utility of the risk reductions—the  αs—to be the same for all 
population sizes used in the questionnaire. We argue that doing so should bring only 
negligible biases upon the estimated VSL. The results of such a restricted model are 
reported in table 7 for the full sample. All coefficients are close to their counterparts in 
table 6, and the implied VSL for a risk reduction to be incurred in the current year is 
€5.58 million (s.e. €0.771 million). This figure is in the ballpark of the values of a 
statistical case of cancer derived by Gayer et al. (2000, 2002) under alternate assumptions 
about how individuals form and update their priors about risks.
23 
It is also very close to the VSL figure ($6.1 million, 1999 dollars) used by the US 
EPA in its policy analyses (US EPA, 2000) and higher than that used by the European 
Commission (whether or not a 40% cancer premium is added).
24 Our 5.6 million lies on 
                                                 
21 We remind the reader that the VSL is what people are willing to pay in the current year for a marginal 
change in risk to be incurred entirely in the current year, and that here it is estimated as α divided by β, 
multiplied by one million. (The multiplication by one million is necessary because in our dataset for 
estimation purposes the risk reduction was coded as 10, 20, or 30, instead of 10, 20, or 30×10
-6.)  
22 The standard errors were computed using the delta method (described in Appendix D).  
23 Gayer et al. (2000) find that a reduction of individual cancer risk by 1.81E-06 after the Remedial 
Investigation results in a implied value of statistical case of cancer between $3.9 and 4.6 million. If we 
assume that the conditional mortality for cancer is 70% (see below) and adjust to 2005 dollars (see 
http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateCPI.html), the resulting VSL is $6.7-7.9 million.  
24 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/others/recommended_interim_values.pdf.  
   29
the high end of the range of VSL found by Alberini and Chiabai (forthcoming) in a 
previous CV study of Italians, where attention was restricted to the risk of dying for 
cardiovascular and respiratory causes, the risk reduction was private and there was no 
mention of environmental circumstances.  
 
Table 7. Non-linear conditional logit model. Full sample (Nobs=6256, Number of 
respondents=782). 
 coefficient  t  stat. 
ALPHA 0.0050  8.38
BETA 0.0009  12.36
DELTA 0.0741  9.82
Log L  -5369.20 
 
 
D. Implications for Latency  and Permanence 
As shown in table 7, the discount rate in the simplified model is 7.41%. This 
figure is significantly different from zero, suggesting that our respondents do indeed 
discount risk reductions that occur in the future. This estimate of the discount rate is 
reasonable, but not too low, confirming that a unit of risk reduction is valued less if it 
occurs in the future, and suggesting that people care about permanence, but not at any 
cost. Our respondents discount future risk reductions at a rate that is well within the range 
estimated in earlier studies (typically 1-14%; see Alberini et al., 2006).  
The implications of a discount rate of this magnitude can be illustrated in several 
ways. For example, for a risk reduction of 1 in a million in the current year, the VSL is 
€5.6 million, but if this risk reduction were to be incurred in 10 years, the applicable VSL 
would be €2.66 million (s.e. around the VSL €0.296 million), and if it were to be incurred 
20 years from now—the lag used in analyses of arsenic maximum contaminant limits in   30
drinking water
25—the applicable VSL would fall to only €1.26 million (s.e. €0.158 
million). (This is because a one-time risk reduction of 1 in a million a year occurring 10 
years from now is equivalent to an immediate, one-time risk reduction of 0.4766 in a 
million. The same 1-in-a-million risk reduction occurring 20 years from now is 
equivalent to an immediate, one-time risk reduction of 0.2272 in a million.) 
As a second example, consider a program that delivers an annual risk reduction of 
10 in a million, and begins in two years. If the risk reduction were to continue for 10 
years, the typical respondent’s one-time WTP would be €340. This would increase to 
€502 if the duration of the program doubled, €579 if it lasted 30 years, €616 if it lasted 40 
years, and €626 if it lasted 45 years. Clearly, the WTP is less than proportional to the 
duration of the program (and to total nominal—undiscounted—risk reduction), as shown 
in Figure 2.    
                                                 
25 A 20-year lag between now and the time of the risk reduction is, for example, that considered by the EPA 
Science Advisory Board when examining the maximum contaminant limit allowable for arsenic in drinking 
water. See www.house.gov/science/ets/oct04/ets_charter_100401.htm (accessed 22 January, 2006).    31
Figure 2. WTP for a program with  R ∆ =10 per million per year starting two years 
from now. 
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Consider now two programs that save the same number of (undiscounted) lives 
and affect the same population (1 million people), except that in one the risk reduction is 
10 in a million a year and the duration of the program is 20 years, while in the other the 
risk reduction is 20 in a million a year and the duration of the program is 10 years. Both 
programs would realize the risk reductions starting two years from now. The one-time 
WTPs for these programs are €502 and €680, respectively, confirming that our 
respondents value more highly programs that saves lives sooner, even if those programs 
are shorter-lived.  Finally, consider the former of these two programs, but imagine that it 
began saving lives 10 years from now: WTP would fall from €502 to €277. 
 
E. The Effect of Individual Characteristics    32
  The results from the model with individual-specific marginal utilities of risk 
reduction, income and discount rates are displayed in table 8. We remind the reader that 
these results refer to equation (10), which posits that the VSL is “individuated” (Sunstein, 
2004), but constant with respect to the size of the population living in the areas with the 
sites that would be affected by the hypothetical policy.  
  Table 8 (top right portion) displays the estimates of the marginal utilities of 
income. In this specification of the model, our low-income dummy takes on a value of 1 
if the respondent’s income is below the sample average, and zero otherwise. Clearly, 
people with income below the sample average have a higher marginal utility of income 
than the remainder of the sample, which is consistent with prescriptions from economic 
theory.
26 
Turning to the marginal utility of risk reductions, Table 8 shows that males value 
risk reductions more highly, all else the same, but that having a college degree does not 
imply a statistically different marginal utility of risk reductions. Likewise, the α 
coefficients on age group dummies are insignificant.  
Surprisingly, persons who told us they knew about contaminated sites in their 
neighborhood or near their workplace (KNOW), and persons who care about the health 
effects of exposure to contaminants (IMPX) appear to value risk reductions less than the 
other respondents. Perhaps the former effect is due to the fact that familiarity with 
contaminated sites reduces the perceived severity of risk. Alternatively, it is possible that 
people may have self-selected into areas with contaminated sites, so that the negative sign 
captures the fact that people living close to such sites are less bothered by their presence. 
                                                 
26 We experimented with different ways of constructing the low income dummies (for example, a low-
income person is one with annual household income less than €15,000, which corresponds to about a 
quarter of the sample), and found that the results are qualitatively robust to these changes.    33
We do not have a good explanation for why people who worry about the health risks of 
contaminants should value less highly risk reductions.
27 At any rate, both effects are 
sizeable: They lower the VSL by €0.850 million and €1.860 million for a respondent with 
relatively low income.  
We conjectured that acceptance of government contaminated site remediation 
programs should affect the marginal utility of risk reductions, and ultimately the WTP for 
the program, and indeed these expectations are borne out in the data. Respondents who 
believe that the government should take care of orphan sites (ORFAN) value the risk 
reductions and the program more highly than the other respondents, whereas people who 
deem it “very useful” to fence and prohibit access to contaminated sites (CART) are 
willing to pay less, all else the same. Perhaps doing so is judged sufficient to reduce risks, 
so that no additional long-term remediation is deemed necessary.  For a lower-income 
person, holding such an opinion lowers the VSL by €0.950 million.  
Finally, respondents whose family members have had cancer (FAMCAN) and 
respondents who profess to use seatbelts (SEATB) when they travel in the back seat of a 
car—which we interpret as indicating concern about mortality risks—value risk 
reductions more highly. The corresponding increases in WTP for a less wealthy person 
are €2.76 million and €2.09 million, respectively.  
Regarding the determinants of the personal discount rates, we find that, all else 
the same, discount rates are 1 percentage point lower for persons with young children, 1 
percentage point higher for married persons, and almost 3 percentage points lower among 
people of ages 45-54. They are also 1.8 percentage point higher for males, but this effect 
                                                 
27 We conjectured that such a negative coefficient might reflect the negative correlation between IMPX and 
the educational attainment of the respondent, but found that the correlation coefficient between IMPX and 
COLLEGEDEGREE is very low (-0.07). We conclude that this is an unlikely explanation.   34
is statistically significant only at the 10% significance level, whereas the abovelisted 
associations are all significant at the 5% level or better.  
  
Table 8. Non-linear conditional logit with individual-specific marginal utility of risk 
reduction, income and discount rate. 
 
marginal utility of ∆R    marginal utility of income 
variable  coefficient t stat.    variable  coefficient t stat. 
ALPHA1 0.003704 3.168   BETA  0.00063 6.122 
A_KNOW -0.00092 -2.271   BETAPOOR 0.00044 3.865 
A_IMPX -0.00199 -2.559        
A_COLLEG -0.00038 -0.764   discount rate 
A_BONI  0.000433 1.206   variable  coefficient t stat.  
A_AGE55P -0.00137 -1.194   DELTA  0.091449 5.326 
A_AGE45 -0.00111 -0.976   D_KIDS  -0.00988 -1.988 
A_AGE35 -0.00178 -1.469   D_MARRIE  0.010502 1.972 
A_MALE 0.002868 3.314   D_DURAT -0.0351 -4.130 
A_CART -0.00102 -2.485   D_FUTBEN  0.005837 1.253 
A_ORFAN 0.001959 3.704   D_SOLFUT  -0.0066 -0.834 
A_FAMCAN 0.002955 2.800  D_MALE  0.017756 1.672 
A_SEATB 0.002242 5.221   D_AGE55P -0.01859 -1.282 
       D_AGE455  -0.02879 -2.003 
       D_AGE354  -0.02214 -1.399 
       D_FCANC  0.025818 2.164 
 
That people are internally consistent is confirmed by the fact the discount rate is 
3.5 percentage points lower for those persons who strongly agree with the statement that 
remediation should be as permanent as possible, even if it costs more (dummy DURAT). 
By contrast, the coefficient on a dummy capturing whether the respondent favors 
remediation even if its benefits are experienced 30 or more years from now—FUTBEN—
and that on a dummy—SOLFUT—capturing sole concern for future generations as a 
driver of the responses to the conjoint choice questions are not statistically significant. 
Finally, people whose family members have had cancer tend to have significantly higher 
discount rates (by about 2.6 percentage points).     35
 
F. Additional Tests of Internal Validity 
  In our questionnaire, we also ask the following question: “Suppose there were two 
public programs for cleaning up contaminated sites. These two programs differ for 
technology and completion time. Program A saves 100 lives now. Program B saves X 
lives in Y years. If the cost of the two program were the same, which would you choose, 
A or B?” X and Y were varied to the respondents (X= 150, 200, 300, 400; Y = 10, 20, 30, 
40, 45).
28    
  Let D* be the discount rate that makes the two programs have equal discounted 
lives saved.
29  In our survey, D* ranged from less than 1 percent to about 14%. The 
respondent should choose program A if his or her own discount rate, Di, is greater than 
D*, B if Di is less than D*, and should be indifferent between the two programs if Di is 
equal to D*.  
  We assume that Di is i.i.d. normal with mean  D µ  and variance 
2
D σ . Our sample is 
thus a mix of binary and continuous observations, and the log likelihood function is  
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where  ) (⋅ Φ  and  ) (⋅ φ are the cdf and pdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively.  
                                                 
28 For comparison, Cropper et al. (1991, 1992) ask a sample of Maryland residents, a sample of residents of 
the Washington, DC, area, and a national sample the following question: “Without new programs, 100 
people will die this year from pollution and 200 people will die 50 years from now. The government has to 
choose between two programs that cost the same, but there is only enough money for one.  Program A will 
save 100 lives now. Program B will save 100 lives 50 years from now. Which program would you 
choose?” The number of lives saved by program B and the number of years from now when lives are saved 
were varied to the respondents.  
29 In other words, assuming constant exponential discounting,  D*=(-1/Y)*(ln(100/X)).   36
  The responses to the latter question indicate that most people (80%, or 626 
individuals) prefer the program that saves lives now, 14.7% (115 people) prefer the one 
that saves lives in the future, and 5.2% (41 people) are indifferent between the two.
30 We 
estimate  D µ  to be equal to 12.36%, while  D σ  is pegged at 0.0870 (see table 9, panel 
(A)). The former figure suggests that the mean discount rate is larger than, but within the 
ballpark of, the discount rate inferred from the conjoint choice tradeoffs. The latter 
indicates that there is substantial heterogeneity among people’s individual discount rates.  
Such heterogeneity is consistent with the fact that, when asked to rate their 
agreement with the statement “We should avoid spending money on cleanup programs 
that will save lives only 30 years from now” on a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1=strongly 
disagree and 5=strongly agree), 40.55% of the sample chose response category 1, 10.07% 
chose 2, 14.43% chose 3, 7.46% chose 4, and 23.76% chose 5. 
Equation (11) can be amended to allow the expected value of Di to depend on 
individual characteristics of the respondents (such as age, gender, knowledge of the 
problem of contaminated sites, education, etc.). As shown in table 9, panel (B), we find 
only modest evidence that Di depends systematically on individual characteristics of the 
respondents. Whatever evidence there is, however, it is broadly consistent with that from 
the earlier conjoint choice question exercise: The discount rate for lives is about 2 
percentage points lower for those respondents who are at least somewhat favorable to 
remediation even when its benefits are incurred many years into the future (dummy 
FUTBEN), and 2 percentage points lower among the 45-54 year-olds.  
 
                                                 
30 Cropper et al. (1991) report that in their combined Maryland and Washington, DC area samples, fully 
40% of the respondent chose the program that saves lives now, even when the number of lives to be saved 
in the future was very large.    37






Model with covariates 
Variable  Coefficient T Stat.  Coefficient T Stat. 
Intercept   0.1236 14.21 0.1385 8.05 
kids15 0.0029 0.25 
married 0.0000 0.00 
durat 0.0026 0.23 
futben -0.0222 -2.34 
solofuture -0.0111 -0.66 
male -0.0052 -0.58 
age55plus 0.0011 0.07 
age4554 -0.0241 -1.64 
age3544 -0.0047 -0.30 
famcancer 0.0066 0.65 
D σ   0.0870 10.23 0.0854 10.29 
Log L  -285.83  -279.59 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have deployed conjoint choice questions to investigate the tradeoffs people 
are prepared to make between income and mortality risk reductions delivered by 
contaminated site remediation programs. Our survey questionnaire was designed to 
investigate the value that people place on permanent risk reductions, and to assess the 
effect of lag (or latency), i.e., people pay now, but the risk reduction is incurred in the 
future. The questionnaire was self-administered using the computer by a sample of 
residents of four Italian cities with serious contaminated site problems.  
We find that people are willing to pay for permanence, but not just any price.  We 
estimate the VSL for an immediate risk reduction over the current year to be about €5.6 
million. The VSL does not vary significantly with the size of the population that would 
be affected by the policy. However, the VSL is lower if the risk reduction occurs in the 
future. For a risk reduction occuring exactly 20 years from now, for example, we estimate   38
our respondents’ VSL to be only €1.27 million.  People discount future risk reductions at 
a rate of 7.41%, which means that each respondent is willing to pay €340 now for a risk 
reduction of 10 in a million per year that begins in two years and continues over 10 years. 
For a more permanent risk reduction, such as one that continues over 20 years, each 
respondent would be willing to pay €502. For one that continues over 30 years, the WTP 
would be €579, and for one that lasts 45 years, €626. Clearly, risk reductions that take 
place in the more distant future are valued less highly than more immediate risk 
reductions.  
We find evidence that the VSL is individuated, in that it depends on observable 
individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender and income), familiarity with contaminated 
sites, concern about the health effects of exposure to contaminants, and direct experience 
with cancer. The VSL also depends on what the respondent thinks the goals of a 
remediation program should be, and on which government actions he or she deems 
appropriate. (However, policymakers may not be able to use all of this information in 
policy analyses, because attitudes, beliefs and confidence in specific government actions 
are usually not known for the entire population of beneficiaries of the policy.)  
Additional questions indicate that the rate at which people discount future risk 
reductions in money versus risk tradeoffs is within the ballpark of the rate at which they 
discount future lives. We interpret this as further evidence of good internal validity of the 
data, and of the fact that people were paying attention to the attributes of the program we 
wanted to focus on, including the futurity of risk reductions.  
The results of this study could be used in benefit-cost analyses of Superfund-like 
programs. Unfortunately, information about current risks associated with contaminated   39
site exposures before and after cleanup of sites on the Italian National Priorities List are 
not publicly available. Absent these data, we perform an illustrative benefit-cost analysis 
for a 43-hectare operating unit within the broader NPL site at Marghera, near Venice, 
Italy. In this operating unit—a former industrial waste dump owned by the City of 
Venice—soil and groundwater are heavily contaminated with PAHs, heavy metals, and 
many other toxicants.  
Following Patassini et al. (2003, 2005), we focus on soil, for which remediation 
options include soil washing, thermal desorption, capping, and excavation with 
subsequent shipment of the contaminated soil to an approved hazardous waste disposal 
facility. We restrict attention to capping—the least permanent of remedies—and to 
excavation and removal of soil—the most permanent and the most expensive, and assume 
reuse for residential purposes. Based on their estimate of excess lifetime cancer risks 
(4.78E-03) and a conservative assumption of 70% conditional mortality,
31 the annual 
mortality risk for residents is 4.54E-05. Assuming that risk reductions would begin 10 
years from now, and an exposed population of 30,000—as estimated in the Master Plan 
of the City of Venice (Regione Veneto and Comune di Venezia, 2004)— a permanent 
remedy like excavation and removal of the contaminated soil would require at least an 
87% risk reduction for the mortality benefits to exceed the cost of remediation (€45,589 
million).
32 By contrast, the least permanent of remedies, capping, which is estimated to 
                                                 
31 This rate is for the 1980s, the most recent period for which estimates are available (see 
http://www.istitutotumori.mi.it/menuistituto/diparclinici/epidemiologia, and Verdecchia et al., 2001). 
32 These calculations assume that the risk reductions would last 45 years. Patassini et al. suggest that 
excavation and removal of the contaminated soil affords a 95% risk reduction. This would imply benefits 
for €49 million, whereas the costs of the remedy is €45 million.    40
cost about €5 million, results in positive net benefits even for 20% reductions from the 
baseline risk, and even if we assume that the lifetime of the cap is only 10 years.
33  
Caution should be used in interpreting our results, however, because they are 
based on one operating unit, and the Marghera NPL site is comprised of many operating 
units. In addition, our estimates do not include other benefits of cleanup, such as benefits 
to ecological system, other economic benefits from the redevelopment of the area, etc.  
The results from our study can also be used to cast some light on the issue of re-
use of contaminated sites, which is an important goal of current policies and programs 
(US GAO, 1995, 1997b). For industrial and commercial use, cleanup targets are often 
allowed to be less stringent than for residential use. This may in turn imply that cleanup 
is completed earlier. The discount rate estimated in this study suggests that to get the risk 
reduction sooner, people would be willing to settle for a smaller risk reduction. Suppose 
cleanup delivers an annual risk reduction of 10 in a million for 10 years beginning 10 
years from now. To bring these risk reductions forward to 2 years from now, people 
would be willing to settle for an annual risk reduction of 5.53 in a million.  
Likewise, to get the risk reduction sooner, people would be willing to accept less 
permanence. Consider for example an annual risk reduction of 10 in a million to begin in 
10 years and continue for 30 years. To bring the risk reductions forward to 2 years from 
now, people would be willing to settle for a remedy that lasts 9.25 years.  These are 
intriguing implications of the preferences elicited through our approach, which we hope 
to explore more explicitly in future research.  
                                                 
33 These calculations sound a common theme with those in Gayer et al (2000), who report that their upper 
bound measure of welfare benefits of $10.1 million for reducing cancer risks is smaller than the EPA’s 
estimated total costs of remediation for the areas of investigation ($56.8 million). By contrast, less 
permanent measures such as fencing and deed restrictions cost about $5.4 million and result in positive net 




Agenzia per la Protezione dell’Ambiente e per i Servizi Tecnici (2004), “Metodologie, 
Tecniche e Procedure per il Supporto degli Interventi di Valorizzazione dei Siti 
Inquinati”, Rome, June.  
 
Alberini, Anna and Aline Chiabai (forthcoming), “Urban Environmental Health and 
Sensitive Populations: How Much are the Italians Willing to Pay to Reduce their 
Risks?” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2006. 
 
Alberini, Anna, Maureen Cropper, Alan Krupnick and Nathalie Simon (2006), 
“Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction: Does Latency Matter?” Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty, 32, 231-245. 
 
Ashenfelter, Orley (2006), “Measuring The Value Of A Statistical Life: Problems and 
Prospects,” NBER working paper 11916, Cambridge, MA, January. 
 
Banca d’Italia (2006), I bilanci delle famiglie italiane nell'anno 2004, Supplementi al 
Bollettino statistico anno XVI n. 7, Rome, January. 
 
Barnett, Harold (1994), Toxic Debts and the Superfund Dilemma. Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Chilton, Susan, Judith Covey, Lorraine Hopkins, Michael Jones-Lee, Graham Loomes, 
Nick Pidgeon, Anne Spencer (2002), “Public Perceptions of Risk and Preference-
based Values of Safety,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 25(3), 211-232. 
 
Cropper, Maureen L., Sema K. Aydede and Paul R. Portney (1991), “Discounting Human 
Lives,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 73(5), 1410-1415. 
 
Cropper, Maureen L., Sema K. Aydede and Paul R. Portney (1992), “Rates of Time 
Preference for Saving Lives,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
82(2), 469-472. 
 
DeShazo J.R., and Trudy A. Cameron (2005), The Eﬀect of Health Status on Willingness 
to Pay for Morbidity and Mortality Risk Reductions, California Center for 
Population Research On-Line Working Paper Series, CCPR-050-05. 
 
Fischoff, Baruch, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, Stephen Read and Barbara Combs 
(1978), “How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes towards 
Technological Risks and Benefits,” Policy Sciences, 9, 127-152. 
 
Gayer, Ted, James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi (2000), “Privat e  V a l u e s  o f  R i s  
Tradeoffs at Superfund Sites: Housing Market Evidence on Learning About 
Risks,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(3), 439-451.   42
 
Gayer, Ted, James T. Hamilton, and W. Kip Viscusi (2002), “The Market Value of 
Reducing Cancer Risk: Hedonic Housing Prices with Changing Information”, 
Southern Economic Journal, 69(2), pp 266-289 
 
Gupta, Shreekant, George van Houtven, and Maureen Cropper (1996), “Paying for 
Permanence: An Economic Analysis of EPA’s Cleanup Decisions at Superfund 
Sites,” RAND Journal of Economics, 27(3), 563-582. 
 
Hamilton, James and W. Kip Viscusi (1999), Calculating Risks? The Spatial And 
Political Dimensions Of Hazardous Waste Policy, Cambridge and London: MIT 
Press. 
 
Hammitt, James K. and Jin-Tan Liu (2004), “Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the 
Value of Mortality Risk”, The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 28(1), 73-95. 
 
Hanley, Nick, Susana Mourato, and Robert E. Wright (2001), “Choice Modelling 
Approaches: A Superior Alternative for Environmental Valuation?” Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 15(3), 435-462. 
 
Hird, John A. (1994), Superfund: The Political Economy Of Environmental Risk, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
 
Horowitz, John K. and Richard T. Carson (1990), “Discounting Statistical Lives,” 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 3, 403-413. 
 
Itaoka, Kenshi, Aya Saito, Alan Krupnick, Wiktor Adamowicz and Taketoshi Taniguchi 
(2006), “The Effect of Risk Characteristics on the Willingness to Pay for 
Mortality Risk Reductions from Electric Power Generation,” Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 33(3), 371-398. 
 
Legambiente (2005), “La chimera delle bonifiche”, 
http://www.legambiente.com/documenti/2005/0510_dossier_bonifiche/La_chimer
a_delle_bonifiche.pdf (accessed January 31, 2006) 
 
Martuzzi, Marco, Francesco Mitis, Aannibale Biggeri, Benedetto Terracini, Roberto 
Bertollini (2002), “Ambiente e stato di salute nella popolazione delle aree ad alto 
rischio di crisi ambientale in Italia,” Epidemiologia e Prevenzione, 26(6), 1-56. 
 
McDaniels, Timothy L., Mark S. Kamlet, and Gregory W. Fischer (1992), “Risk 
Perception  and the Value of Safety,” Risk Analysis, 12. 495-503. 
 
Meyer, Peter B. (2000), “Looking at State Voluntary Cleanup Programs in Perspective: 
Liability Relief, Flexible Cleanup Standards and Institutional Controls as Forms 
of Economic Development Subsidies,” Working Paper, Center for Environmental 
Policy and Management, University of Louisville.   43
 
Mitis, Francesco, Marco Martuzzi, Annibale Biggeri, Roberto Bertollini, Benedetto 
Terracini (2005), “Industrial Activities in Sites at High Environmental Risk and 
Their impact on the Health of the Population,” International Journal of 
Occupational and Environmental Health, 11, 88-95. 
 
Moore, Michael J. and W. Kip Viscusi (1990), “Models for Estimating Discount Rates 
for Long-Term Health Risks Using Labor Market Data,” Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 3, 381-401. 
 
Patassini, Domenico, Paola Cossettini, Enrico De Polignol, Markus Hedorfer, and Enrico 
Rinaldi (2003), “El.Gi.R.A. Una procedura di aiuto alla conoscenza nelle aree di 
bonifica di Porto Marghera (Venezia),” paper presented at a FEEM seminar, 
http://www.iuav.it/Didattica1/pagine-web/facolt--di2/Domenico-
P/ricerca/Bonifiche-/slide_ELGIRA.pdf (accessed July 31, 2006) 
 
Patassini, Domenico, Paola Cossettini, Enrico De Polignol, Markus Hedorfer, and Enrico 
Rinaldi (2005), “ELGIRA: Support System for Knowledge Building and 
Evaluation in Brownfield Redevelopment”, in CORILA (ed.), Scientific Research 
and Safeguarding of Venice, Research Programme 2001-2003, Volume III, 
CORILA, Venice, 5-20. 
 
Probst, Katherine and David Konisky (2001), Superfund’s Future: What Will it Cost? 
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.  
 
Regione del Veneto and Comune di Venezia (2004), “Master Plan per la bonifica dei siti 
inquinati di Porto Marghera,” 
 http://www.regione.veneto.it/NR/rdonlyres/408958E0-542A-4227-9CF9-
46025D51DBDF/0/134.pdf (accessed August 2, 2006). 
 
Revesz, Richard L. and Richard B. Stewart (1995), “The Superfund Debate,” in Revesz, 
Richard L. and Richard B. Stewart (eds.), Analyzing Superfund: Economics, 
Science, and Law, Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
 
Sunstein, Cass R. (2004), “Are Poor People Worth Less than Rich People? Disaggregating 
the Value of a Statistical Life,” AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 
Working paper 04-05, Washington, DC, January. 
 
Tsuge, Takahiro, Atsuo Kishimoto, Kenji Tekeuchi (2005), “A Choice Experiment to the 
Valuation of Mortality,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 31(1), 73-95. 
 
Turvani, Margherita, Aline Chiabai, Anna Alberini, and Stefania Tonin (2006), “Public 
Support for Policies Addressing Contaminated Sites: Evidence from a Survey of 
the Italian Public,” paper presented at the 3
rd World Congress of Environmental 
and Resource Economists, Kyoto, Japan, July. 
   44
US Environmental Protection Agency (2000), Guidelines for Preparing Economic 
Analyses, EPA 240-R-00-003, Washington, DC, September.  
 
US General Accounting Office (1995), Community Development: Reuse of Urban 
Industrial Sites, GAO/RCED 95-172, Washington, DC, June. 
 
US General Accounting Office (1997a), Superfund: State Voluntary Programs Provide 
Incentives to Encourage Cleanups, GAO/RCED-97-66, Washington, DC, April.  
 
US General Accounting Office (1997b), “Superfund. Proposals to Remove Barriers to 
Brownfield Redevelopment”, GAO/T-RCED-97-87, March. 
 
Vassanadumrongdee, Sujitra and Shunji Matsuoka (2005), “Risk Perceptions and Value 
of a Statistical Life for Air Pollution and Traffic Accidents: Evidence from 
Bangkok, Thailand”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30(3), pp 261-287. 
 
Verdecchia, Arduino, Angela Mariotto, Riccardo Capocaccia, Gemma Gatta, Andrea 
Micheli, Milena Sant, Franco Berrino (2001), “Incidence and prevalence of all 
cancerous diseases in Italy: trends and implications”, European Journal of 
Cancer, 37, 1149-1157. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip (2003), “The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market 
Estimates,” NBER Working Paper 9847, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, and James T. Hamilton (1999), “Are Risk Regulators Rational? 
Evidence from Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions,” American Economic 
Review, 89(4), 1010-27. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip and Joel Huber (2006), “Hyperbolic Discounting of Environmental 
Quality,” NBER Working Paper No. W11935, Cambridge, MA. 
   45











The table below shows two government programs, A e B, addressing contaminated sites. These 
programs are guaranteed to be effective and to save lives.  
As you can see, each program has different effects and saves a different number of lives. Please 




Program features   Program A  Program B 
Number of lives saved every year in 







000 . 000 . 1
10  







000 . 000 . 1
10  
Population: the number of people living 
in the areas with the targeted 
contaminated sites 
1,000,000 2,000,000 
Delay: the number of years before the 
risk reduction begins   2 years  2 years 
One-time tax payment: amount of tax 
household will have to pay for the 
remediation program 
50 euro  100 euro  
Duration: number of years over which 
lives are saved  20 years  20 years 
 
16. Which program would you choose between A e B? 
A    B   
 
17. If you could choose between A, B e neither program, which would you choose? 
 
A    B     NEITHER   
Recall, every year  







000 . 000 . 1
243  
die in Italy for causes due to exposure to contaminants 
at contaminated sites   46
 
Appendix B. Comparison between the sample and the population.  
 
Table B.1 Education  






   sample  populationsample populationsamplepopulationsample population     
Elementary 
school 5,00  19,68  1,49  10,46  9,50  21,79 6,90  18,00 5,72  19,60 
Completed middle 
school/junior high 42,00 27,43  26,37 27,08  36,50  29,50 20,69  31,87 31,34  34,31 
High school 
diploma 47,00  31,98  60,69  37,50  42,50  28,77 47,70  34,10 49,51  32,08 
College or higher  11,00  16,88  11,45  23,34 11,50  15,28 24,63  14,74 13,43  10,95 
 
Table B.2 Average after-tax household income (€/yr) 
 
Population 
(2004) Sample   
Northern 
Italy  33,376   31,905 
Southern 
Italy 21,463    21,612 
Italy 29,483    26,784 
    
males 32,200    28,088 
females 23,204    25,442 
    
up to 30 
years 29,821    24,860 
31-40 30,213    24,053 
41-50 33,810    29,372 
51-65 35,187    26,760 
   47
Appendix C. Simple conditional logit model of the responses.  




deltarisk  37559 8.96
popul  4.48E-08 0.85
duration  0.006795 2.54
costperyear  -0.0262 -8.49
 
 




deltarisk  37327 9.2
popul  -1.42E-07 -2.75
duration  0.000373 0.15
costperyear  -0.0174 -5.76
  
 
Appendix D. Delta method. 
For large samples and assuming that the model is correctly specified, the 
maximum likelihood estimates from the conditional logit are normally distributed around 
the true vector of parameters, and the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix, Ω, is the 
inverse of the Fisher information matrix. If we assume for simplicity that the indirect 
utility is that of equation (2), the VSL is computed as: 





= VSL  . 
We use the delta method to produce the variance around the VSL (equation 
(A.1)): 
(A.2)   Ω∆g g ∆ ′ = ) (WTP Var ,  
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